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Abstract 
We investigate whether and how Euroskeptic challenger parties use their campaign 
communication in the up-run to the 2014 EP elections campaign to mobilize against Europe. 
We assume that Euroskeptic challengers’ mobilization forces pro-European mainstream, 
especially conservative parties to react in order to avoid losing votes. These pro-European 
mainstream parties have three possibilities to react: silencing of EU integration issues, 
forcefully putting forward their own (mainly) pro-EU positions or adopting EU-critical 
stances.  
We study Euroskeptic challenger parties’ campaign communication and the reaction of pro-
European mainstream parties in Austria and Germany based on a quantitative content analysis 
of their press releases in a period of eight weeks preceding the EP elections. We thereby 
expect German conservatives – being challenged for the first time by a right-wing party – to 
react with silencing strategies, whereas the conservatives in Austria – which already have lost 
a substantial segment of voters to right-wing parties – to voice their own (pro-EU) positions.  
Keywords: European Elections, Election Campaigns, Euroskeptic Parties, pro-European 
Parties, Content Analysis 
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Introduction 
For a long time, researchers agreed that the EU is a compromise-seeking machine that 
produces “policy without politics” (Schmidt, 2006: 5). The lack of a politics dimension points 
to the fact that Europe was neither publicly visible nor were different opinions on Europe 
voiced. Instead, for domestic parties and mass media, Europe was a side- or even a non-issue 
(e.g. De Vreese, 2003; Ferrara & Weishaupt, 2004; Gerhards, 2000). Even European elections 
were rated “second-order” driven by domestic concerns (Reif & Schmitt, 1980) and with 
relatively little attention paid to (Cayrol, 1991; Holtz-Bacha, 2005). Some researchers even go 
so far as calling European elections “third-order” elections, because even regional elections 
are paid more attention by the population and the media (Reif, 1997; Wilke & Leidecker, 
2013). 
Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, with more and more competences shifted to the 
European level, the thesis of the EU as a non-issue was confronted with new empirical facts. 
First, citizens’ “permissive consensus” (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970) has started to dissolve 
(Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Hooghe, 2009). Citizens have formed 
more stable and well-structured opinions regarding EU integration (Boomgaarden et al., 2011) 
that differ sharply from elites’ attitudes (Mittag & Wessels, 2003) and that even impact voting 
on the national level (De Vries, 2007). Second, we have seen new Euroskeptic parties 
emerging and segments of traditional parties turning critical towards EU integration (e.g. 
Hooghe & Marks, 2006; Taggart, 1998; van Spanje & de Vreese, 2011). These developments 
lead us to pose the core research questions of this paper:1 
Do national parties today mobilize on EU integration and thereby foster the 
politicization of EU integration? 
Which role do Euroskeptic challenger parties play for EU contestation and how do 
pro-European mainstream parties react to these challengers?  
To answer both questions, we analyze the campaign communication of Euroskeptic 
challenger parties in two party systems in which such parties have experienced very different 
results in preceding elections: Whereas in Austria the established right-wing Euroskeptic 
party FPÖ gained a fifth of all votes in the 2013’s national election, in Germany the just 
recently founded Euroskeptic force at the right side of the party spectrum (‘Alternative für 
Deutschland´) won 4.7 percent of the votes, the Euroskeptic challenger from the left (‘Die 
Linke`) gained a vote share of 8.6 percent. We pose the question whether Euroskeptic parties 
in the stabilisation or crisis management phase of the sovereign dept crisis (took their chance 
and clearly voiced their anti-EU positions in the up-run to the 2014 EP elections, challenging 
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the pro-European parties on new EU-related issues. We further explore whether and how pro-
European parties reacted to such Euroskeptic challenges. All analyses are based on a 
quantitative content analysis of press releases published by the political parties in a period of 
eight weeks prior to the 2014 EP elections.        
In the following we will first provide a summary of the literature on parties’ politicization of 
EU integration, we will then derive our more specific research questions and hypotheses, 
explain our countries selection and methods of data collection, coding and analysis, proceed 
with the presentation of our empirical findings and finally come to conclusions also regarding 
suggestions for future research. 
 
Parties’ politicization of EU integration 
Politicization is a process that results in public debate about a political issue. According to de 
Wilde, politicization has two characteristics: salience is attached to specific issues and 
polarized opinions are publicly voiced (De Wilde, 2007). In general, there are two agents of 
politicization: mass media and political actors (Hooghe & Marks, 2008; Kriesi, 2008). The 
former agent possesses a considerable potential to arouse the sleeping giant and to shape 
citizens’ attitudes to the EU (e.g. De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; J. Maier & Rittberger, 
2008) as citizens have very little direct experience with the Union. However, media as 
politicization agents depend on other (political) actors to put an issue on the agenda. E.g., 
Jalali and Silva (2011) show for the 2009 European Parliament (EP) election campaign that 
European issues only capture the attention of the mass media if national parties provide EU 
cues in their campaigns (see also Adam, 2007a; De Vreese, 2003; Machill, Beiler & Fischer, 
2006; Schuck et al., 2011; Taggert & Szczerbiak, 2002).  
Research on parties’ strategic decisions whether to put EU issues on the agenda however is 
divided. Some researchers claim that national parties still refrain from communicating Europe 
(e.g. Green-Pedersen, 2011). Politicization on issues of EU integration is hampered by 
internal party disagreements (Edwards, 2009; Ferrara & Weishaupt, 2004; de Vreese, 2006), 
because it neither fits the traditional left-right paradigm of political competition (Eijk & 
Franklin, 2004; Thomassen, Noury, & Voeten, 2004; Van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009), nor 
is it predictable to publicly play this issue because it may be linked to a multitude of issue 
areas (Green-Pedersen, 2011). On the contrary, other researchers claim that the politicization 
of EU issues has increased. They find that right-wing parties mobilize against the EU 
especially on identity matters (Adam & Maier, 2011; Hooghe & Marks, 2008; Kriesi et al., 
2006). However, potential reactions of pro-European parties to such challenges have not been 
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analyzed yet. In sum, it is still debated ‘whether’ political parties put EU issues on the agenda 
or not while knowing even less on the question under ‘which conditions’ and ‘how’ they do 
so (see De Wilde, 2007).  
 
Our research is based on the assumption that national parties’ communication is strategically 
driven. Regarding issues, parties have to take two decisions (Green-Pedersen, 2007). First, 
parties use salience to selectively emphasize issues in their public communication that are 
advantageous to the own party, e.g. because the party is judged as competent to solve the 
problems involved (Carmines & Stimson, 1986; Petrocik, 1996; Riker, 1986). As a 
consequence, “(p)arty competition is only secondarily a direct confrontation of opposing 
policies. Most frequently it produces selective emphases on the strong points of one’s own 
case. Second, salience considerations are strongly related to positional strategies. For a 
political party it is not worth to draw attention to issues on which all parties agree as on such 
issues there is nothing to win. As a consequence parties will turn to other, more controversial 
issues (Downs, 1968; Rabinowitz & MacDonald, 1989; Riker, 1996).  
 
Research shows that we can distinguish two party types that profit from different types of 
issues. First, it is mainly governing parties in a two-party system and winning parties vote-, 
policy- and / or office-wise (Müller & Strøm, 1999) in a multi-party system (Hobolt & de 
Vries, 2011) that mobilize on long-existing issues which have been shaping the debate for 
decades. Such established parties do not want to upset their traditional electorate, but want to 
keep the debate on those ‘winning’ issues (Hobolt & de Vries, 2011). Consequently, these 
parties are labeled as ‘issue traditionalists’ that are distinguished from potential ‘issue 
entrepreneurs’ (see for core ideas Carmines & Stimson, 1986, 1993; Hobolt & de Vries, 2011; 
Riker, 1986, 1996): “[i]ssue entrepreneurship refers to a political strategy with which parties 
mobilize new policy issues that have been largely ignored by the political mainstream and 
adopt a policy position on the issue that is substantially different from the current position of 
the mainstream” (Hobolt & de Vries, 2011: 3). By putting new issues and new positions on 
the agenda, issue entrepreneurs seek to “upset the dominant party alignment” (Carmines & 
Stimson, 1993). Such issue entrepreneurs can often be found on the losing side of an existing 
party system: in a two-party system they are in opposition, in a multi-party system they are 
not successful vote-, policy- and / or office-wise (Hobolt & de Vries, 2011, 2012).  
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Empirical research supports the idea of issue traditionalists and issue entrepreneurs: From the 
early post-materialist issue entrepreneurs, who put ecological or gender topics on the agenda, 
till nowadays’ rise of populist right-wing parties (Inglehart, 1971; Ignazi, 1992). On the 
specific question of European integration, research also supports the two distinct roles of issue 
traditionalists and issue entrepreneurs. Europe has largely been ignored by issue 
traditionalists, the core pro-European mainstream parties (e.g. Weber, 2007) whereas losing 
parties, e.g. those without coalition experience, are likely to put issues of EU integration on 
the public agenda voicing anti-EU positions (Hobolt & de Vries, 2011, 2012). Also Adam et 
al. (2013) show that it is primarily Euroskeptic parties at the rims of the political spectrum and 
distant from government participation, that most openly criticize EU integration. In the 
following we will therefore distinguish the communication strategies of Euroskeptic parties 
and pro-European parties, in the second group focusing on ‘winning’ mainstream parties. 
 
In earlier years researchers have claimed that parties talk past each other: issue entrepreneurs 
put new issues on the agenda whereas issue traditionalists, the mainstream parties, stick to 
those issues which they have been using for decades (e.g. Petrocik, 1996; Saglie, 1998). 
However, more and more empirical research questions the general validity of the selective 
emphasis thesis (for summaries of the literature see Baumann, Haber, & Wältermann, 2011; 
Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2010). Sigelman and Buell (2004) for example show for the 
U.S. elections since 1960 that attention profiles of parties converge and that intra-party 
continuity is smaller than issue convergence. Such an issue convergence is in line with the 
argument that no party has a monopolistic agenda control (Steenbergen & Scott, 2004). 
Instead each party observes its dynamic issue environments. For parties it is difficult to ignore 
these issue environments as they are expected to have a position on all issues, as ignorance 
goes along with an eschewal of shaping the positional struggle (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 
2010) and as otherwise they run the risk of being accused of inactivity (Van Noije, 
Kleinnijenhuis, & Oegema, 2008). Vliegenthart et al. (2011) for example show that parties 
determine each others’ agendas especially if they are in the same language region, part of a 
coalition, ideologically close or occupy a successful niche. Yet, these strategic interactions of 
parties have only recently gained attention what makes Kriesi et al. (2008) as well as Hooghe 
and Marks (2008) call for more research exactly in this realm in order to understand how 
issues are politicized. In this paper we seek to add to the state of research by exploring 
whether Euroskeptic challenger parties as potential issue entrepreneurs try to mobilize on 
European issues and whether their strategic communication has an spill-over effect on pro-
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European (mainstream) parties, the issue traditionalists. Thereby we don’t limit our analyses 
to the issues put forward by the parties but include the evaluations political parties voice 
regarding the overall idea of European integration, but also regarding the functioning of EU 
institutions as well as regarding concrete EU policies. In the following section, we’ll derive 
our specific research questions and hypotheses.   
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
First, we have to address the questions which parties have to be considered as potential issue 
entrepreneurs in the European realm and under which conditions they become active, putting 
European issues on the agenda. Potential issue entrepreneurs regarding Europe are those who 
have a position different from the pro-European mainstream parties (so-called “issue 
traditionalists”). At least for most European countries, mainstream parties still adhere to a 
moderate pro-EU consensus (Eijk & Franklin, 2004; Hix, 1999; Hooghe & Marks, 2002; 
Helbling, Hoeglinger & Wüest, 2010). The party landscape at the domestic level has 
consequently been described as a silent “cartel” (Weber, 2007). However, since more 
competences have been shifted to the EU and new countries have entered the Union, 
Euroskeptic parties have emerged in most EU countries. Following Taggart (1998: 366), 
Euroskepticism “expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as 
incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.” 
This broad term encompasses those “who stand outside the status quo” (Taggart, 1998: 366). 
Euroskeptic parties are potential issue entrepreneurs which might challenge the silent pro-EU 
cartel.  
Our analysis compares parties’ strategic communication in two European countries, Germany 
and Austria, that differ significantly regarding the relevance of Euroskeptic parties within 
their party systems (see next section). In both countries, we can observe Euroskeptic forces 
driven by right-wing parties, but in Germany we can also find an example for leftist 
Euroskepticism by the party ‘Die Linke’. Even though public support for the EU varies 
between both countries, citizens’ support in Germany has also been decreasing during the 
financial crisis (Eurobarometer, 2013). Therefore, we assume that Euroskeptic parties in both 
countries have an incentive to challenge the pro-European mainstream parties regarding 
matters of EU-integration, leading to our first hypothesis 
 
H1: In the run-up to the 2014 EP elections Euroskeptic parties in Germany and 
Austria will take the chance campaign on European issues.  
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However, as public opinion towards the European Union still is significantly more positive in 
Germany than in Austria and as public contestation of anti-EU statements is by far less 
frequent in Germany, German Euroskeptic parties will be more hesitant to voice anti-EU 
positions and their critique will focus more on the performance of EU institutions and specific 
EU policies, while Austrian Euroskeptic parties will also tackle fundamental questions of 
European integration.  
 
H2a: The relative amount of Euroskeptic campaign statements voiced by Euroskeptic 
parties will be higher in Austria than in Germany. 
 
H2b: In Germany, Euroskeptic parties will focus their critique on the performance of 
EU institutions and specific EU policies, while Austrian Euroskeptic parties will also 
tackle more fundamental questions of European integration. 
   
Then, we turn to the question which issues Euroskeptic challenger parties put on the agenda. 
Opposition to Europe on the economic dimension in general stems from the left who 
mobilizes against a free-market Europe. Opposition to Europe on a cultural dimension most 
often originates from right-wing parties which mobilize on matters of national sovereignty 
and identity (see for empirical evidence Adam & Maier, 2011). Thereby, most authors 
conclude that the main mobilization against Europe today refers to the cultural dimension and 
is brought up by right-wing parties (Adam & Maier, 2011; Hix, 2007; Hooghe & Marks, 
2008). However with the ongoing debt and financial crisis in Europe, new opportunities for 
mobilization might emerge. However, it is an open question in which new forms 
Euroskepticism will materialize. Hypothesis 3 therefore sticks to the more traditional claims: 
 
H3: Right-wing EU issue entrepreneurs mobilize on cultural matters whereas left-wing 
issue entrepreneurs mobilize on economic matters.  
 
Finally, we turn to the question whether pro-European (mainstream) parties react to their 
Euroskeptic challengers and which communication strategy they choose. As Bale et al. (2010) 
show, issue traditionalists have different options to deal with challenges: they may either stay 
issue traditionalist trying to silence the new and rising issue by shifting the attention to their 
core issues or they may turn into issue followers. As issue followers there are two 
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alternatives: First, they may voice their traditional position – a position that contrasts 
Euroskeptic issue entrepreneurs. In this case they follow the challenger salience-wise, yet 
polarize by voicing their pro-European position. Second, they may react by not only 
discussing the issue, but as well by adopting an EU-evaluation that is close to the issue 
entrepreneur. Empirically, we know that all strategies occur (regarding polarization strategies 
see Adam, et al., 2014; regarding all strategies Bale, et al., 2010). Yet, we know hardly 
anything on how parties react to each another. The relevance of the overall party agenda for a 
single party’s strategic communication has been shown (e.g. Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 
2010; Steenbergen & Scott, 2004; Vliegenthart, et al., 2011). However, it’s an open question 
to which degree single Euroskeptic challenger parties can shape the agendas of pro-European 
(mainstream) parties. A strong influence is most likely if issue entrepreneurs are already 
successful in elections (Vliegenthart, et al., 2011). Beyond, we might expect that a higher 
number of issue entrepreneurs mobilizing on the same new issue might in sum also be able to 
shape the party agenda. Hypothesis 4 predicts: 
 
H4: Euroskeptic issue entrepreneurs are more successful in forcing pro-European 
mainstream parties to also address an issue, the more influence they have within the 
party system, i.e. the higher their vote shares or the number of challenger parties are. 
 
Following hypothesis 4 we expect a much stronger influence of Austrian Euroskeptic parties 
on the party agenda than in Germany.  
 
The final question now is how issue traditionalists react if they are forced to turn into issue 
followers: Do they go for a polarization strategy which would result in politicization of issues 
on EU integration? Or do they favor an adoption strategy not defending their pro-EU stances 
also playing the ‘anti-EU card’? Research leads us to assume that these reactions depend on 
the ideological proximity of parties (Vliegenthart, et al., 2011). It is plausible to assume that 
right-wing populist Euroskepticism that is strongly focused on cultural matters of EU 
integration leads Socialists to opt for polarization strategies whereas Conservatives may try 
adoption strategies. Vliegenthart et al. (2011) have shown that Conservatives are more likely 
to take up right-wing Euroskepticism. Euroskepticism from the left side of the political 
spectrum is likely to lead to reversed reactions by left and right-wing traditional parties. The 
reason: Traditional parties on the right side of the political spectrum struggle themselves with 
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the cultural side of integration whereas traditional parties on the left do so regarding a free-
market Europe (Kriesi, et al., 2006). Hypothesis 5 therefore claims:  
 
H5: The closer traditional parties are ideologically to issue entrepreneurs, the lower 
is the probability that they will show polarization strategies. Instead ideologically 
closer parties which are forced into the role of issue followers will opt for adoption 
strategies whereas ideologically more distant parties are more likely to adopt 
polarization strategies.  
 
Research Design, Data and methods  
In order to study the interplay between pro-EU mainstream parties and Euroskeptic challenger 
parties in countries with higher and lower degrees of Euroskepticism in political parties, we 
need to choose (a) a sample of countries, (b) a relevant set of parties included in the study, (c) 
the period of analysis, (d) data sources that provide information on parties’ strategic 
communication behavior, and (e) the appropriate method of analysis. 
 
(a) Selection of countries 
The selection of countries included for the study is strictly derived from the hypotheses we 
want to test. We choose Germany and Austria as two EU-member states which are relatively 
similar concerning the political system and the economic situation, but differ significantly 
regarding the status of Euroskeptic parties within their party systems. To classify the status of 
Euroskeptic parties within the party system, we take into account the ideological position of 
Euroskeptic parties (right- or left-wing), the previous or current government participation of 
Euroskeptic parties on the national level as well as the vote shares of Euroskeptic parties in 
the last national and EP elections (see table 1). 
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Table 1: Criteria of countries’ selection for the study 
Criterium Data source  
Existence of right- and left-wing Eurosceptic 
parties 
2009 PIREDEU-Manifesto-data, Schwarz & 
Santkiewitsch (2014), Taggart & Szczerbiak 
(2002) 
Vote shares of Euroskeptic parties in the last 
national and European elections 
Election results  
(Previous) government participation of  
partly/Euroskeptic parties  (H4) 
Public archives 
 
 
 Political Parties 
 Government  
participation of  
Euroskeptic parties 
Left-right placement  
of Euroskeptic parties 
Vote share of 
Euroskeptic parties 
in the last elections 
  left right low high 
Germany - x x x - 
Austria (x) - x - x 
 
Germany is selected as a country in which Euroskeptic parties currently exist at the right as 
well as the left side of the party spectrum, but as non-established forces with low to moderate 
vote shares (up to 20%; Jandura, 2007) in the last national elections (‘Alternative für 
Deutschland’ (right-wing), 4.7 %; ‘Die Linke’ (left-wing), 8.6 %). As opposed to this, we find 
well established Euroskeptic parties in Austria, which can be described as right-wing populist. 
The FPÖ as the major right-wing challenging party gained high vote shares in the 2013 
national election (2.5 %), the BZÖ − also a Euroskeptic party from the right − won 3.5 of the 
votes in 2013. In addition, Euroskeptic parties have already been part of the Austrian 
government in the past, which underlines, that Euroskeptic positions are more established in 
Austria than in Germany. The Euroskeptic FPÖ had already governmental responsibility in 
the 1980ies in a coalition with the SPÖ (1983-1987) and again from 2003 till 2005 together 
with the ÖVP. Between 2005 and 2007 ÖVP and BZÖ formed the government. 
 
(b) Parties included in the study 
Our study takes into consideration all German and Austrian parties that won at least three 
percent of votes in the last European or national elections and participated in the European 
Elections 2014 (in Austria ‘Team Stronach’ and ‘Liste Martin’ did not participate in the 2014 
EP elections). In sum, our analysis covers 13 parties (and their corresponding fractions) – 
seven from Germany and six Austrian parties. These political parties may be categorized on 
four dimensions (see tables 2 and 3). 
 11 
1) Position regarding European Integration/European Union. As we are interested 
into parties’ contestation about Europe, our study includes pro-European as well as 
Euroskeptic parties.  
2) Current government participation of Euroskeptic parties on the national level. As 
our research question aims to cover the interplay between communication 
strategies of pro-European governing parties and Euroskeptic challenger parties, 
both “types” of parties have to be included in our study. 
3) Another indicator for the status of Euroskeptic political parties is their vote share 
(in the last national election) – how much support do Euroskeptic parties receive 
by a country’s electorate? 
4) Ideological position. Euroskeptic parties may be found on the right- or left-wing of 
a party system and are assumed to justify their Euroskepticism with different 
arguments.  
 
Table 2: Categorization of German political parties included in the study 
 Attitude towards EU 
Europhile Euroskeptic 
left right left right 
Government Participation 
Yes 
High vote 
share 
SPD 
CDU, 
CSU 
/ / 
Low vote 
share 
/ / / / 
No 
High vote 
share 
/ / / / 
Low vote 
share 
Grüne  FDP 
Die 
Linke 
AfD 
 
Table 3: Categorization of Austrian political parties included in the study 
 Attitude towards EU 
Europhile Euroskeptic 
left right left right 
Government Participation 
Yes 
High vote 
share 
SPÖ ÖVP / / 
Low vote 
share 
/ / / / 
No 
High vote 
share 
/ / / FPÖ 
Low vote 
share 
Grüne 
 
 
/ 
/ BZÖ 
*NEOS describes itself as a liberal party apart from the classical left-right-divide (NEOS, 2014). 
NEOS* 
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In the German case we analyze five pro-European (governing) parties and two Euroskeptic 
(challenging) parties, in the case of Austria four pro-European (two of them with government 
responsibility) parties and two Euroskeptic (challenging) parties as well. The tables show that 
the array of political parties in Austria is more Euroskeptic (higher vote shares) than in 
Germany.  
 
(c) Period of analysis 
Most campaign-studies focus on the so called “hot phase” of election campaigns (usually up 
to four weeks prior to the election). However, we believe that politicization processes are 
context sensitive – campaigns may trigger different issue dynamics (Van Noije et al., 2008). 
Therefore we choose a longer period of observation, i.e. eight weeks prior to the EP elections 
2014. This allows us to study the strategic communication of challenging Euroskeptic parties 
that potentially may mobilize against Europe, as well as the reactions of pro-European parties 
to this challenge. As we don’t have any experiences yet, how long it takes a challenging party 
to put an Euroskeptic issue on the overall party agenda (does it have to “push” the issue for 
several days or even for weeks?) and how long it takes till other, pro-European parties react 
on this politicization (within some days or weeks?), the analysis of a longer time period seems 
necessary. 
 
(d) Data sources 
To study parties’ campaign communication several data sources may be taken into account: 
party manifestos, campaign posters and TV-spots as well as press releases. All of these data 
sources have their strengths but also their shortcomings (Netjes & Binnema, 2007). 
Manifestos, posters and spots are only published during the “hot phase” of the election 
campaign. As we want to cover a broader time period, these sources do not seem ideal for our 
task. Press releases in contrast are constantly available not only during election campaigns, 
but also during non-election periods. They are a continuous communication tool that is geared 
at the media and the general public. 
 
For these reasons, we collected all press releases the aforementioned parties published eight 
weeks prior to the 2014 EP elections. In the case of Austria all press releases were available 
from the “Originaltext-Service GmbH” (OTS). For Germany, we collected the necessary press 
releases from party archives and party homepages. As we are only interested in politicization 
of European issues, only press releases that referred to European policies, European 
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institutions, European politicians and/or the EP elections at least twice were included in the 
analysis. To identify relevant press releases, we compiled an electronic search string that 
contained the relevant key words and word componentsi. This search resulted in a total of 235 
relevant press releases for Germany and 729 cases for Austria within eight weeks prior to the 
2014 EP elections. 
 
(e) Method of analysis 
To systematically analyze the content of the press releases, we conducted a quantitative 
content analysis of all relevant press releases (census). To ensure the reliability of coding, all 
coders took part in a common thorough training and then conducted a (researcher-coder) 
reliability test of 25 press releases each. We tested reliability of coding according to Holsti-
Formula as well as according to Krippendorff’s Alpha coefficient whenever possible or 
useful. With average results for formal categories (e.g. date of publishing, source, country 
etc.) of 0.98 – 1.00 according to the Holsti-Formula respectively of 0.97 – 1.00 according to 
Krippendorff’s Alpha and reliabilities for content characteristics (e.g. mainissue, evaluation 
of the EU etc.) of 0.76 – 0.98 (Holsti) respectively 0.74 – 0.90 (Krippendorff’s Alpha) across 
the two countries, reliability tests delivered satisfactory results.  
Our unit of analysis is the statement of the actor (politician or party) who published the press 
release. In addition to formal categories, aspects of content were captured. The main focus 
was on the main issue covered in the press release, the evaluation of the general idea of 
European integration and the evaluation of the actual functioning of the EU, its institutions, 
politicians and policies. We compiled an issue list composed of 16 main issue fields (and 149 
subtopics) that follows the PIREDEU (2009) issue list (see attachments, table 1).ii 
 
Results  
In the following, we test our hypotheses regarding the strategic communication of Euroskeptic 
parties in the run-up to the EP elections 2014 comparing a country with Euroskeptic parties on 
the fringes of the party spectrum (Germany) and a country with well-established anti-EU 
forces (Austria). We analyze if Euroskeptic parties address European issues, in which way 
they voice their critique of the European Union and how the pro-European parties react to 
those challengers.  
 
First, we want to provide an overview on how active the different parties in both countries 
were in publicly addressing European issues. As a measure for this activity, we use the 
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amount of EU-related press releases a party published per week. Looking at the absolute 
numbers (see figure 1 and 2), we can see clear differences between the two countries: Most of 
the German parties published up to ten press releases with EU-references per week (see figure 
1). On average, German parties addressed European politics in only four press releases per 
week. Looking at the Austrian parties, we see much more activity with an average of 15 
releases per week (see figure 2).  
 
Figure 1: Press releases with reference to the EU per party and week – Germany 
(absolute numbers) 
 
N = 235 press releases 
 
Figure 2: Press releases with reference to the EU per party and week – Austria 
(absolute numbers) 
 
N = 729 press releases 
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However, the share of press releases with EU-references in all published press releases per 
partyiii (see attachments, figure 1 and 2) is relatively similar in both countries. During the 
2014 EP campaign, German parties mentioned the EU in 32 percent of their press releases, 
while the Austrian parties did so in 37 percent of the cases. German as well as the Austrian 
pro-European and Euroskeptic parties address European issues during the campaign phase. 
Another similarity in both countries is that right-wing fringe parties referred to EU-topics the 
most often. The German AfD as well as the Austrian BZÖ mentioned EU-Topics in about half 
of their press releases (AfD: 48 percent; BZÖ: 53 percent).  
 
Hypothesis 1 claimed that all Euroskeptic parties would use the chance to address European 
topics in the run-up to the 2014 EP elections. This hypothesis is approved by the data, as we 
can not only see that all Euroskeptic parties talked about European politics, but they addressed 
European issues even relatively more than the pro-European parties. While the German 
parties all use about a third of their press releases to talk about EU-issues and the Euroskeptic 
parties only have a little higher share (34 percent) than the Europhile parties (32 percent) (see 
figure 3), the difference in Austria is clearer. As figure 5 shows, the mean value is 44 percent 
for Euroskeptic parties and only 34 percent for pro-EU parties. The well-established anti-EU 
parties in Austria seem to be more active in voicing EU topics than the German Eurosceptic 
fringe parties. 
 
Figure 3: Mean share of press releases with EU-reference (in %) 
 
N = 964 
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We’re not only interested in the amount of published press releases that refer to European 
politics, but even more in what particular issues they deal with and whether these issues are 
framed in a Euroskeptic manner. Do challenging Euroskeptic parties connect European issues 
with anti-EU statements? Our second hypothesis claims at first (H2a) that the amount of 
Euroskeptic statements voiced by Euroskeptic parties will be relatively lower in Germany 
than in Austria as public opinion towards the European Union is more positive in Germany 
than in Austria and as Euroskeptic parties in Germany experience less support in the 
electorate than in Austria. 
We test our hypothesis by analyzing how often the political parties explicitly and negatively 
evaluate 1) the general idea of European integration – that means a fundamental critique on a 
strong cooperation of European states within the framework of the European Union regarding 
economy, politics, legal and international affairs – and 2) the actual functioning of the EU (as 
an economic and political union of 28 member states), its institutions (like the European 
Commission, the European Council, etc.), European politicians (EP candidates/members) and 
concrete EU policies (regulations, laws, etc.). In general, it is possible to support the idea of 
European integration while criticizing the actual functioning of the European Union. Critique 
on the functioning of the EU in that sense is more specific than critique on the general idea of 
European integration as a whole (that would be fundamental critique). 
Our second hypothesis secondly (H2b) expects that Euroskeptic parties’ specific critique on 
the actual functioning of the EU in Germany will be relatively higher than fundamental 
critique on the general idea of European integration, while Austrian Euroskeptic parties will 
also tackle more fundamental questions of European integration.   
 
Our analysis shows that the vast majority of EU-related press releases from Euroskeptic 
challenger parties in Germany as well as in Austria do not contain explicit negative 
evaluations of the general idea of European integration (see Figures 4 and 5). 
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Figure 4: Evaluation of the general idea of European integration – Germany (in %) 
 
Basis: Number of press releases: Die Linke: n = 34, AfD: n = 17. Share of press releases without evaluations: Die 
Linke: 94%, AfD: 88%. 
 
Figure 5: Evaluation of the general idea of European integration – Austria (in %) 
 
Basis: Number of press releases: FPÖ: n = 105, BZÖ: n = 81. Share of press releases without evaluations: FPÖ: 
84%, BZÖ: 85%. 
 
In Germany, 94 percent of all EU-related press releases published by the Linke and 88 percent 
of all press releases from the Alternative für Deutschland did not contain evaluative 
statements on the general idea of European integration at all. The cases that contained 
evaluative statements were – without exception – positive (6 percent of all press releases from 
the Linke and 12 percent of all press releases from the AfD). In Germany no fundamental 
critique on the idea of a European Union as a whole is made – the general impression of 
European integration is absolutely positive, even on side of the Euroskeptic parties. 
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In Austria the picture is somewhat different. Indeed, even in Austria the majority of press 
releases from Euroskeptic challenger parties did not provide any statements regarding the 
general idea of European integration at all (84 percent of all press releases from FPÖ and 85 
percent from BZÖ did not contain such evaluative statements). But if Euroskeptic challenger 
parties in Austria did evaluate the idea of European integration, different from Germany, they 
also voiced fundamental critique in their press releases. Five percent of the FPÖ’s press 
releases contained critical statements about the idea of European integration in general, and 
11 percent of the press releases from the smaller BZÖ. While in the case of FPÖ 11 percent of 
press releases contained positive evaluations of EU integration (and therefore dominated the 
negative evaluations), positive evaluations in the press releases of the BZÖ only occurred in 
four percent of the cases. Therefore, the smaller BZÖ seems to be the more “radical” 
Euroskeptic challenger party in Austria. 
Turning to the specific critique on the actual functioning of the EU, as stated in H2b, in both 
countries the amount of negative evaluations by Euroskeptic parties is higher than their 
critique on the general idea of European integration (see Figures 6 and 7). 
 
Figure 6: Evaluation of the actual functioning of the EU – Germany (in %) 
 
Basis: Number of press releases: Die Linke: n = 34, AfD: n = 17. Share of press releases without evaluations: Die 
Linke: 38%, AfD: 53%. 
  
6 6
56
41
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Die Linke AfD
positive negative balanced
 19 
Figure 7: Evaluation of the actual functioning of the EU – Austria (in %) 
 
Basis: Number of press releases: FPÖ: n = 105, BZÖ: n = 81. Share of press releases without evaluations: FPÖ: 
42%, BZÖ: 52%. 
 
In Germany, 38 percent of all EU-related press releases published by the Linke and 53 percent 
of all press releases from the AfD did not contain evaluative statements on the actual 
functioning of the EU. The cases that contained evaluative statements were predominantly 
negative: 56 percent of all press releases from the Linke and 41 percent of AfD press releases. 
Only six percent of the press releases from both parties evaluated the EU, European 
institutions, European policies or European politicians positive. 
 
In Austria the picture is quite similar. 42 percent of all EU-related press releases from FPÖ 
and 52 percent from BZÖ did not evaluate the actual functioning of the EU. And we cannot 
clearly say that Euroskeptic challenger parties from Austria do voice substantive more 
critique on the actual functioning of the EU than Euroskeptic challenger parties from 
Germany. 54 percent of all press releases from the FPÖ contained negative EU-evaluations 
and almost half of all BZÖ press releases. But the two Euroskeptic parties from Austria do 
voice positive evaluations on the EU functioning less often than the two German Euroskeptic 
parties (FPÖ: 4 percent positive evaluations; BZÖ: 1 percent). In total, EU-criticism is only 
voiced a little bit more often by Euroskeptic challenger parties in Austria than in Germany 
and EU-praise is voiced a bit less often in Austria. Therefore H2a seems to be confirmed. 
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Table 4: Mainissues of Press Releases – Germany (in %) 
 
 
EU-skeptic 
parties 
Europhile 
Parties 
 
Negative 
Evaluations 
Negative 
Evaluations 
Positive 
Evaluations 
 
Challenger 
Parties 
Governing 
Parties 
Challenger 
Parties 
Governing 
Parties 
Challenger 
Parties 
 
left right left right left right left right left right 
 Linke AfD SPD CDU* CSU** Greens FDP SPD CDU* CSU** Greens FDP 
Economy 22.2 28.6 12.5 0.0 0.0 27.3 0.0 29.4 27.3 0.0 8.3 20.0 
Social policy /Labor market 0.0 14.3 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Law and Order 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.5 9.1 100.0 41.7 60.0 
Immigration 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 
International affairs 27.8 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 5.9 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 
Environment/Energy 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 5.9 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Consumer protection 5.6 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 18.2 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Citizens’ rights 11.1 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 18.2 0.0 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Constitutional questions 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 50.0 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Territorial questions 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 
Administration and 
Bureaucracy 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Elections 0.0 42.9 37.5 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.2 0.0 0.0 20.0 
Other Issues 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 18.2 0.0 23.6 9.1 0.0 16.7 0.0 
N 18 7 8 3 2 11 2 17 11 2 12 5 
*CDU, including the CDU-CSU-coalition in the national parliament. **CSU acting as autonomous party in Bavaria. 
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Table 5: Mainissues of Press Releases – Austria (in %) 
 
 
EU-Skeptic Parties Europhile Parties 
 
Negative Evaluations Negative evaluations Positive Evaluations 
 
Challenger 
Parties 
Governing 
Parties 
Challenger 
Party 
Governing 
Parties 
Challenger 
Party 
 
right right left right left liberal left right left liberal 
 FPÖ BZÖ SPÖ ÖVP Greens NEOS SPÖ ÖVP Greens NEOS 
Economy 16.1 42.1 18.6 0.0 16.0 0.0 31.3 31.3 33.3 14.3 
Social policy /Labor market 5.4 5.3 12.9 0.0 4.0 0.0 14.6 6.7 0.0 0.0 
Law and Order 1.8 7.9 5.7 0.0 4.0 0.0 10.4 2.2 11.1 7.1 
Immigration 10.7 5.3 0.0 6.3 20.0 0.0 4.2 2.2 0.0 0.0 
International Affairs 10.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 0.0 7.1 
Environment/Energy 7.1 2.6 5.7 0.0 28.0 0.0 6.3 2.2 22.2 0.0 
Consumer protection  3.6 0.0 2.9 0.0 4.0 50.0 12.5 2.2 11.1 7.1 
Citizens’ rights 0.0 5.3 5.7 0.0 4.0 0.0 6.3 2.2 0.0 7.1 
Constitutional questions 5.4 2.6 1.4 6.3 4.0 50.0 0.0 4.4 0.0 7.1 
Territorial questions 3.6 5.3 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 11.1 0.0 
Administration and 
Bureaucracy 8.9 2.6 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Elections 21.4 18.4 38.6 62.5 8.0 0.0 8.3 24.4 0.0 28.6 
Other Issues 5.4 2.6 4.2 25.1 4.0 0.0 4.2 13.4 11.1 21.4 
N 56 38 70 16 25 2 48 45 9 14 
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Next, we turn to the question which issues Euroskeptic challenger parties in Germany and Austria 
put on their agenda and connect them with negative evaluations of the actual functioning of the 
EU. In our content analysis we covered 16 main issue fields (e.g. economy, social and labour 
market policy, education and research, elections etc.) with 149 subtopics in total. In the 
following, we’ll analyze to which main issues the negative EU-evaluations voiced by the 
Euroskeptic parties were attached (see Tables 4 and 5).  
 
The issues Euroskeptic challenger parties in Germany connected most often with critique on the 
functioning of the EU are economic issues (Linke: 22 percent of all press releases related to 
European issues; AfD: 29 percent), international affairs (Linke: 29 percent; AfD: 14 percent) and 
elections (Linke: 0 percent; but AfD: 43 percent). Most of the “economic” press releases dealt 
with the stimulus package and safety umbrellas (ESM, EFSM, Eurobonds etc.), namely 16 
percent of all press releases (related to European politics) from the Linke and even 17 percent of 
the press releases from the AfD. Most of the press releases on international affairs dealt with the 
Crimean Crisis, a conflict unfolding the region of Crimea that started in 2014 in the aftermath of 
the Ukrainian revolution (14 percent of AfD’s analyzed press releases) respectively European 
relations to Russia as a consequence of this conflict (16 percent of the Linke’s analyzed press 
releases). The Linke as a left-leaning party also criticized immigration policies (17 percent) that 
regulate immigration from outside the EU (asylum, border controls), environment and energy 
issues as well as citizens’ rights (both about 11 percent). The right-leaning AfD voiced EU 
criticism regarding social policies (14 percent), especially family policy matters like child care or 
parental leave, and regarding the EP 2014 elections (43 percent; mostlycritique on EP candidates 
from other parties). 
 
In Austria, the policy areas in which Euroskeptic challenger parties voiced most critique on the 
European Union are – similarly to Germany– economic issues (FPÖ: 16 percent; BZÖ: 42 
percent), international affairs (FPÖ: 11 percent; but BZÖ: 0 percent), immigration (FPÖ: 11 
percent; BZÖ: 5 percent) and elections. Even the subtopics that are connected with negative EU-
evaluations are nearly the same: Regarding international affairs it is also the Crimean Crisis and 
Europe’s relations to Russia that are matters of concern, regarding immigration it is policies on 
asylum or border controls, and concerning elections other EP candidates are criticized most often. 
However, the economic subissues differ somewhat: they are more diverse (12 subissues in 
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Austria versus three in Germany) and the focus is not on the stimulus package or on safety 
umbrellas (only 5 percent of the negative BZÖ press releases), but also on interest rate (8 
percent), inflation (5 percent), EU depts (5 percent) or bank and financial sector regulation (5 
percent), for example. 
 
We now turn to the question whether Euroskeptic challenger parties have the potential to 
influence the strategic communication behavior of pro-European parties. Hypothesis 4 claims that 
Euroskeptic parties with higher vote shares should have a stronger impact on the overall party 
agenda than challenger parties with less support in the electorate. Therefore, we expect an 
especially strong influence of the FPÖ in Austria and a minor effect of the smaller German 
Euroskeptic parties. In the following, we will again first analyze the degree and forms of negative 
EU evaluations voiced by pro-European parties in both countries and then focus on the question 
whether Euroskeptic parties have been successful in placing concrete issues on the overall party 
agenda. 
 
Regarding the evaluation of the general idea of European integration by Euroskeptic parties, 
we’ve observed above that such challenger parties in Germany did not at all voice fundamental 
critique in their press releases; instead, EU-evaluation was even positive to some extent. In 
Austria however, FPÖ’s and especially BZÖ’s press releases contained critical statements about 
the idea of European integration in general. Turning to the mainstream parties in Germany now 
(figure 8), we find that CSU (25 percent), SPD (26 percent), FDP (44 percent) and Greens (26 
percent) only voiced positive evaluations of the general idea of EU integration. The only 
exemption being the governing CDU: Besides 10 percent of clearly positive statements, this party 
also provided criticism in 2 press releases (one dealing with labour market regulations and one 
with agricultural policies) and one balanced evaluation (on the EP elections). It’s interesting to 
see that the major governing party in Germany was the only one to voice some critique on the 
general idea of European integration. However, this critique was not provoked by any of the 
Euroskeptic parties.  
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Figure 8: Evaluation of the general idea of European integration in Germany (in %) 
 
Basis: Number of press releases: CDU: n = 39, CSU: N=8, SPD: n = 73, FDP: n = 18, Greens:  n = 46. Share of press 
releases without evaluations: CDU: 82%, CSU: 75%, SPD: 73%, FDP: 56%, Greens: 74. 
 
Figure 9: Evaluation of the general idea of European integration in Austria (in %) 
 
Basis: Number of press releases: ÖVP: n = 158, SPÖ: n = 293, Greens: n = 75, NEOS: n = 16. Share of press 
releases without evaluations: ÖVP: 63%, SPÖ: 77%, Greens: 81%, NEOS: 56%. 
 
 
The picture is very similar in Austria (figure 9): With only one exception (SPÖ, 1 percent), all the 
evaluative statements of mainstream parties were positive regarding the general idea of EU 
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integration (ÖVP: 37 percent; SPÖ: 22 percent; Greens: 19 percent; NEOS: 44 percent). The 
negative evaluation of EU integration from the SPÖ was connected with an issue of EU consumer 
protection policy and an issue of EP elections 2014 (candidates). 
 
Turning from the evaluation of the general idea of European integration to the evaluation of the 
actual functioning of the EU, i.e. EU-policies, we’ve observed significantly more critical 
statements by Euroskeptic parties in this category in Germany as well as in Austria. We also find 
such specific EU-skepticism among pro-European parties in both countries (figures 10 and 11). 
 
Figure 10: Evaluation of the actual functioning of the EU – Germany (in %)  
 
Basis: Number of press releases: CDU: n = 39, CSU: N=8, SPD: n = 73, FDP: n = 18, Greens:  n = 46. Share of press 
releases without evaluations: CDU: 62%, CSU: 50%, SPD: 62%, FDP: 56%, Greens: 46. 
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Figure 11: Evaluation of the actual functioning of the EU – Austria (in %)  
 
Basis: Number of press releases: ÖVP: n = 158, SPÖ: n = 293, Greens: n = 75, NEOS: n = 16. Share of press 
releases without evaluations: ÖVP: 59%, SPÖ: 57%, Greens: 53%, NEOS: 69%. 
 
In Germany, the governing CDU shows positive evaluations the most often (28 percent) and the 
fewest critique (8 percent). Their coalition partner, SPD, also seems quite reluctant to voice 
criticism even on specific policies (12 percent); while the percentage of critical statements is 
higher for the CSU (also part of the governing coalition on the national level: 25 percent), the 
FDP (17 percent) and the Greens (24 percent). In Austria the governing ÖVP provided a positive 
evaluation for EU-policies in 30 percent of their press releases and voiced criticism in only 10 
percent of the cases. Their coalition partner SPÖ however, showed significantly more EU-
critique (24 percent), while the Greens even criticized concrete EU-policies in 33 percent of the 
cases. The new pro-European party NEOS voiced EU-criticism in 19 percent of their press 
releases. In sum, we can state that in both countries we find similar degrees of specific EU-
criticism voiced on the one side by Euroskeptic and on the other side by pro-European parties. 
Different than expected, specific EU-criticism stemming from Euroskeptic parties was not higher 
in Austria than in Germany. The percentages of statements criticizing specific EU-policies voiced 
by Europhile parties were much smaller than for Euroskeptic parties in both countries. It’s 
interesting to note, but not astonishing, that in both countries, the right-leaning governing parties 
were the ones that voiced the fewest critical statements on EU-policies. As we find significant 
proportions of specific Euro-criticism from Euroskeptic and Europhile parties in both countries 
alike, the question now is whether this can be interpreted as a spill-over effect in the sense that 
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communication of Eurokeptic parties about specific issues forces Europhile parties to also pick 
up these issues in their communication. We therefore turn to the analysis of issues communicated 
about in the next section. 
 
Table 4 (see above) first displays connected to which issues Euroskeptic parties in Germany 
voiced negative EU-policy evaluations. It shows that economic issues were the field in which 
both parties (Linke and AfD) voiced most critique, followed by international affairs. The left-
leaning Linke also criticized EU’s immigration policies, while the right-leaning AfD challenged 
the mainstream parties regarding social policies. Now, looking at the way in which the pro-
European parties communicated in these fields, we find that the major governing party in 
Germany, CDU, regarding economic matters did not pick up the negative evaluations provided 
by the challenger parties, but on the contrary provided positive evaluations (27 percent) in this 
area. However, the left leaning SPD as well as the green party seemed a bit torn between negative 
(13 and 27 percent) and positive (29 and 8 percent) evaluations of EU’s economic policies. The 
second important area of the challengers’ critique, i.e. international affairs, none of the pro-
European parties really turned into a campaign issue. This also holds true for immigration 
policies. However, in the field of social policy the EU-evaluations-are divided. The right-leaning 
AfD and the left-leaning SPD connect this issue with negative evaluations (AfD: 14 percent; 
SPD: 25 percent), while the right-leaning CDU shows positive evaluations in this field (18 
percent). A spill-over effect from Euroskeptic to Europhile parties does not seem reasonable. 
In table 5 (see above) the connection between issues and evaluations is provided for the Austrian 
parties. It’s interesting to note that the three policy areas in which Euroskeptic parties expressed 
most critique are exactly the same for both countries, i.e. economy, immigration and international 
affairs. In Austria as in Germany, the Euroskeptic parties voiced most critique regarding 
economic EU-policies. As in Germany, the right-leaning governing party (ÖVP) in the same area 
showed clearly positive EU-evaluations, while the left-leaning SPÖ and the Greens also provided 
a mixture of some negative (19 and 16 percent) but mostly positive EU-evaluations (31 and 33 
percent). Regarding the negative evaluations on the subissue “trade policy”, a spill-over effect 
from the right-leaning Euroskeptic FPÖ and BZÖ to the left-leaning Europhile SPÖ and Greens 
seems possible. FPÖ and BZÖ put that issue (connected with a negative EU-evaluation) on their 
party agenda (FPÖ: April, 3rd, 14th, 30th; BZÖ: May, 9th) and a while later also the Europhile SPÖ 
and the Greens talked in a EU-sceptic manner about this issue (the Greens: April, 28th, May, 6th; 
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SPÖ: May, 13th, 15th). Immigration policies in Austria was the second area in which the 
Euroskeptic parties criticized the EU most often (FPÖ: 10.7; BZÖ: 5.3 percent). In this field, the 
Green party (and rudimentarily the ÖVP) also showed criticism, while all other parties did not 
engage in too much evaluations. A potential spill-over may have come from the Euroskeptic FPÖ 
to the Europhile Greens. The FPÖ voiced the issue “immigration policy” on April, 1st-3rd, 17th, 
and May, 12th connected with a negative evaluation of the EU. On April, 8th, 20th, and May, 13th, 
the Greens (and on May, 13th also the ÖVP) put the same issue with a negative EU-evaluation on 
their agenda, too. Finally, FPÖ’s criticism on EU’s international affairs did not lead to significant 
reactions in neither of the other parties. But the issue of “data and personal information security”, 
that was evaluated by the BZÖ in a EU-critical manner concerning EU- on April, 3rd and 4th 
seems to have a spill-over effect on the Europhile SPÖ and the Greens. Both parties put the same 
topic on their agenda on April, 7th and 8th and also connected it with EU-critique. 
 
Hypothesis 4 claimed that the more influence a Euroskeptic party has within the party system, the 
stronger should its influence be on other parties. According to this, we would have expected a 
strong influence of the FPÖ in Austria. And according to hypothesis 5, this impact should have 
been strongest on the ideologically closer ÖVP. However, such an impact can neither be stated 
for the FPÖ in general and also not on the ÖVP. On the contrary, the right-leaning governing 
parties ÖVP in Austria and CDU in Germany were those who engaged solely in positive 
evaluations regarding the most criticized issue-field, i.e. economy.  
 
Conclusion 
In sum, about a third of all press releases, which were published from German and Austrian 
parties eight weeks prior the EP 2014 elections, dealt with European issues. The Euroskeptic 
fringe parties from the right invest most of their publicly voiced information for European 
matters to advance their own positions. The new founded German Alternative für Deutschland as 
well as the Austrian BZÖ used half of their press releases to address EU-matters. In sum the more 
established Austrian Euroskeptic parties (FPÖ and BZÖ) were more active in talking about 
European politics (44 percent) than the German Euroskeptic forces AfD (right-wing) and Linke 
(left-wing) (34 percent). The Euroskeptic parties in Austria were also more active than their 
Europhile counterparts, which addressed European issues in 34 percent of their releases, while 
the German Euroskeptic and Europhile parties were nearly on the same level (34 versus 32 
percent). 
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Regarding the evaluation of the general idea of European integration, we found that Euroskeptic 
parties in Germany did not at all voice such fundamental critique in their press releases; instead, 
even those parties’ general EU-evaluation was positive to some degree. In Austria, the FPÖ’s 
press releases contained some critical statements about the idea of European integration, but also 
more positive evaluations. However, BZÖ voiced critique more often than positive evaluations. 
In sum, we stated that some fundamental EU-criticism was voiced by the Euroskeptic parties in 
Austria, but not at all in Germany.  
In both countries, however, we observed significantly more critical statements regarding the 
actual functioning of the EU. The share of press releases that contained negative evaluations of 
EU-policies ranged between 41 and 56 percent for the Euroskeptic parties in both countries. We 
also found such specific EU-skepticism for the German and the Austrian pro-European parties 
with the governing right-leaning parties CDU (8 percent) and ÖVP (10 percent) being the most 
hesitant to voice criticism, but other pro-European parties criticizing the EU on concrete policies 
in up to 25 percent in Germany (CSU) and up to 33 percent in Austria (Greens). In sum, we state 
that in both countries we find similar degrees of specific EU-criticism voiced on the one side by 
Euroskeptic and on the other side by pro-European parties, with the percentages of critical 
statements being much smaller for Europhile than for Euroskeptic parties. Different than 
expected, specific EU-criticism stemming from Euroskeptic parties was not higher in Austria 
than in Germany. But EU-commendations were in sum lower in Austria than in Germany. 
 
Finally, turning to the question whether Euroskeptic parties have the potential to impact the 
agendas of pro-European parties, we analyzed in which issue fields the Euroskeptic parties had 
voiced their critique. For both countries these were predominantly the three policy areas 
economy, immigration and international affairs. In the case of Germany we were not able to 
detect such spill-over effects from Euroskeptic to Europhile parties. Maybe the amount of 
published, EU-skeptic press releases was too low (and the issues connected to EU-criticism were 
too diverse). But in the case of Austria, we identified three possible spill-over effects from EU-
skeptic evaluated issues voiced by the right-leaning FPÖ and BZÖ to the Europhile left leaning 
SPÖ and the Greens. These issues were “trade policy”, „immigration policy“ and „data and 
personal information security“. 
In our hypotheses we had expected the FPÖ as well-established Euroskeptic party in Austria to 
have a stronger impact on the Austrian pro-EU parties than the significant smaller challenger 
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parties in Germany. However, an impact can neither be stated for the FPÖ in general, nor on the 
right-leaning ÖVP specifically. On the contrary, the right-leaning governing parties ÖVP in 
Austria and CDU in Germany were those that were least skeptical on EU-policies in general and 
engaged solely in positive evaluations regarding the most criticized issue-field, i.e. economy. It 
seems reasonable to assume that the involvement of CDU and ÖVP in political decision-making 
on the European level and especially regarding the handling of the financial crisis prevented them 
from buying into EU-criticism at this point. It would be interesting to compare the 
communication strategy of right-leaning parties in countries with left-leaning governments.   
 
A very interesting finding of our analysis is that EU-skeptical parties in both countries voiced 
their criticism on exactly the same issue fields, i.e. economy, immigration and international 
affairs. The interesting question would be whether EU-skeptical parties campaigned on the same 
agenda (spill-over between parties’ agendas) or whether the parties in their strategic 
communication reacted to the public agenda (spill-over between public and parties’ agendas). In 
order to answer this question, it would be necessary to longitudinally track the emergence of the 
parties’ issue agendas and to compare it with the public agenda, e.g. documented in media 
reports, during the same period of observation. Such an analysis would also enable us to see 
whether the EU-skeptical parties were successful in influencing the media agenda in the up-run to 
the 2014 EP elections. For the pro-European parties in Germany and Austria we can, based on 
our analysis of the campaign period eight weeks prior to the election, not state such an impact of 
Euroskeptic voices.     
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Attachments 
 
Figure 1: Share of press releases with EU-reference per party and week – Germany (in %) 
 
N= 833 press releases 
Figure 2: Share of press releases with EU-reference per party and week – Austria (in %) 
 
N= 1.807 press releases 
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Table 1: Issue List 
 
Topic01 Economy 
01 The Euro (e.g. currency rate, inflation, stability) 
02 Effect of Euro on the economy 
03 Eurozone exit 
04 Other currency related topic 
 
05 Inflation (policy) 
06 Interest rate (policy) 
07 Taxes (policy) 
 
08 Financing the EU: National contributions (from member states) 
09 EU budget / finances / (incl. 3% rule, semester system) 
10 EU debts (incl. 3% rule, semester system) 
11 State budget / state finances / (non EU) 
12 State debts (non EU) 
 
13 EU economic policy: Stimulus package and safety umbrellas (bilateral credits, buying of state 
bonds, Eurobonds, EFSM, EFSF, ESM, SKS) 
14 Bank and financial sector regulation  
15 Banking Union 
16 EU Structural Fund (EU funds for underdeveloped regions/areas) 
17 EU competition policy (incl. investigations into state aid, mergers, take-overs, fixed prices, 
carving up of markets) 
18 Competition policy non-EU (incl. investigations into state aid, mergers, take-overs, fixed 
prices, carving up of markets) 
19 Government Ownership, nationalisation in general (land, banks, etc.) 
20 Privatisation  (of government owned business or industry) 
21 Protectionism (e.g. methods to protect national markets, economic growth) 
22 Government intervention/control over the economy (prices, wages, rents) 
23 Economic Planning (of long-term economic planning, e.g. Greece)  
 
24 Free movement of people within the EU (common market: including the Schengen 
agreement) 
25 Free movement of goods, capital and services within the EU (common market) 
26 EU trade policy (e.g. EU tariffs and import quotas towards non-member states) 
27 Trade policy non-EU 
 
28 Effects of financial crisis on domestic/ EU/ global economy (e.g. competitiveness, demand 
and supply, consumption, business climate)  
29 State of the EU economy, current situation and outlook, growth, shrinkage 
30 Stock market and its developments (shares, bonds, AEX, DAX, Dow Jones etc.) 
31 Business (companies, banks, industry, mergers, manufacturing, bankruptcy) 
 
32 Other economic topics 
 
Topic02 Social and labour market policy 
01 EU employment policy 
02 Employment policy (non-EU) 
03 Labour market regulations (e.g. working hours, wage policy; unemployment insurance, 
unemployment regulation) 
04 Health care (policy) 
05 Retirement and pensions (policy) 
06 Social housing (including poverty, social assistance) (policy) 
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07 Youth (policy) 
08 Family policy (e.g. child care, parental leave) 
 
09 Other social and labor market topics  
 
Topic03 Education and Research 
01 EU education policy 
02 Education policy (non-EU) 
03 Science and research policy 
 
04 Other education and research topics 
 
Topic04 Law and Order 
01 EU police collaboration 
02 Crime prevention policy 
03 Fight against terrorism 
04 Intelligence service 
05 Data and personal information security 
06 Courts, trials, court decisions 
07 Crime (robbery, mugging, killing) 
 
08 Other law and order topics 
 
Topic05 Immigration 
01 EU immigration policy - regulating immigration from outside the EU (e.g. refugees, asylum, EU 
border protection) 
02 Immigration policy (non-EU) - regulating immigration from outside the EU  
03 Migration / immigration policy – regulating migration within the EU (e.g. labour migration from 
Eastern European countries or Southern European countries to the Northern member states) 
04 Immigrant integration 
05 Multiculturalism (cultural diversity, cultural plurality) 
06 Anti-Islam 
 
07 Other immigration topics 
 
Topic06 International Affairs 
01 EU foreign affairs regarding Crimean Crisis 
02 Foreign affairs regarding Crimean Crisis (non-EU) 
03 EU foreign affairs general (e.g. EU-China, EU-Russia, EU-US relations, European 
neighbourhood policy) 
04 Foreign affairs general (non-EU; e.g. relations Germany-US, UK’s role in the UN; relations 
between states or (international) political organizations) 
05 EU defence / peace-keeping / EU security 
06 Defence / peace-keeping / national security  (non-EU; e.g. France sending troops to peace-
keeping mission in Africa) 
07 Armed forces (modernization, structure, expenditure, military strength) 
08 Military cooperations / treaties / obligations (e.g. membership, obligations, NATO) 
 
09 Other international affairs topic 
 
Topic07 Culture 
01 EU cultural and media / communication (policy) (arts, films/movies, theatre, music, media) 
02 Cultural and media / communication (policy) (non-EU) (e.g. subsidies for theatre’s, movies, 
music etc.; the export of own culture, language etc.) 
03 Human interest (soft news: about prominent persons, celebrities, anniversaries, weddings, 
animals, strange/funny events, etc.) 
04 Religion  
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05 Sports weather report/ forecast 
06 (Natural) disasters (earthquakes, floods) 
07 Accidents 
 
08 Other culture and soft news topics 
 
Topic08 Environment and Energy 
01 Climate policy 
02 EU Energy policy – supply safety (e.g. securing energy supply, EU contracts with Gazprom 
and other suppliers) 
03 Energy policy – supply safety (non-EU) 
04 Energy policy – renewable energies (e.g. wind, solar, water) 
05 Energy policy – fossil energies (e.g. fracking) 
06 Energy policy – nuclear energy 
 
07 Other EU environmental and energy topics 
 
08 Other non-EU environmental and energy topics 
 
Topic09 Infrastructure 
01 EU transportation policy 
02 Transportation policy (non-EU) 
03 ICT policy (e.g. communication infrastructure) 
04 Energy grid 
 
05 Other technology and infrastructure topics 
 
Topic10 Agriculture and Food 
01 EU agricultural policy (e.g. subsidies for farmers, food safety, genetically modified food) 
02 Agricultural policy (non-EU) 
03 EU maritime affairs and fishery policy 
04 Maritime affairs and fishery policy (non-EU) 
05 Food safety  
06 Food and public health 
 
07 Other agriculture and food topics 
 
Topic11 Consumer protection 
01 EU consumer protection policy 
 
02 Other consumer protection topics 
 
Topic12 Citizens’ rights 
01 Female rights and equality 
03 Abortion 
04 Immigrant rights 
05 Minority rights (e.g. handicapped, gay marriage, children, elderly) 
06 Private property and copyright rights 
 
07 Other citizens’ rights topics (e.g. Human rights in general, civil liberties, equality before law) 
 
Topic13 Constitutional questions and functioning of the EU 
01 Division of power between political institutions (e.g. between Parliament and Government, 
between the Council and the European Parliament, separation of church and state) 
02 Division of power between political levels (e.g. delegation and transference of decision-
making power between Brussels and the national level; between regional and national levels; 
federalism, regional autonomy AND devolution; subsidiarity) 
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03 EU’s democratic deficit (e.g. distance or ‘gap’ between the EU and its citizens or the 
responsiveness of the EU towards its citizens, citizens feeling not represented or understood 
by the EU) 
04 Division of power between the people and the political system (e.g. democracy, referendums, 
sovereignty of the people); non-EU 
05 Other rules of decision-making (e.g. qualified majority voting, EU treaties,  right to veto, other 
treaty reforms) 
 
06 Competences of the European Parliament (power, legislative procedures) 
07 Competences of the European Commission (Powers of the European Commission) 
08 Competences of the European Council/Council of Ministers (Powers of the European 
Council/Council of Ministers) 
09 Competences of the European Court of Justice (references to the powers of the European 
Court of Justice) 
10 European Central Bank functioning and power 
11 Power and position of the EU presidency of member state 
12 Power and position European Council President/Presidency (Rompuy position) 
13 Power and position European Commission President/Presidency (Barroso position) 
14 Power and position external affairs (Ashton position) 
15 Power and position Eurogroup leader (Dijsselbloem) 
 
16 Other EU polity / constitutional topic 
 
17 European Integration 
 
Topic14 Territorial questions 
01 EU-Membership (existing) (e.g. British referendum on EU membership)  
02 Enlargement (negotiations, criteria, pros and cons) of EU 
03 Potential EU membership Turkey 
04 Potential EU membership other (e.g. enlargement of  EU with Croatia,  Iceland, Macedonia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo)  
 
05 Other territorial questions topics 
 
Topic15 Administration and bureaucracy 
01 Executive and administrative efficiency 
02 EU political corruption, fraud, scandals EU-level politicians or institutions, including 
regulations and anti-corruption measures (not abuse of EU funds by member states) 
03 Political corruption non-EU: Fraud, scandals of non-EU (e.g. national, supranational) 
politicians or institutions, including regulations and anti-corruption measures 
 
04 Other administration and bureaucracy topics 
 
Topic16 Elections 
01 European Elections: Candidates, politicians, parties; their images and strategic positions, 
personality, candidate MEP’s personal character, background, leadership qualities 
02 European Elections: Electioneering, campaigning (strategy, style, finance, fundraising, events, 
media appearances, endorsements, targeting of electoral groups, political marketing, 
publicity, advertising)  
03 Media coverage of the campaign 
04 European elections: Voters, public opinion, polls, (anticipated) electoral success 
05 European Election: Voter turnout (e.g. expectations)  
06 European Elections: List of party positions on issues (a “manifesto story“) 
07 European Elections: Voting procedures (e.g. electronic voting machines, foreign votes 
08 European Elections: Election laws, rules, regulations 
09 European Elections: (Formal, public) debates (as an event) between parties, politicians  
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10 Political consequences of EP election outcome (e.g. for national-level politicians, parties, 
power in the) 
11 EU policy profile of national political parties (e.g. party manifesto on EU integration issues) 
(only in context of EU elections) 
12 Political party groups/alliances in European Parliament (e.g. political party group profile, 
internal affairs, conflict, organization, internal elections) 
13 Vote advice for European Elections 
14 Other EP election-related topics 
 
15 Other National, regional, local elections in EU Countries 
16 Other National elections in non-EU Countries  
 
Topic17 Other topics 
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i
 The search string contains the following key words respectively word components that have to appear at least twice 
or the press release has to contain two various words/components to be identified as relevant press release: “Europ*, 
europ*, EU, EP, EZB, EIB, ESM, EFSF, EFSM, EuGH, EAD, EWSA, EIF, EDSB, EWU, Troika, Frontex, 
FRONTEX, Verfassungsvertrag”. 
ii
 These issue fields are: economy, social and labour market policy, education and research, law and order, 
immigration, international affairs, culture, environment and energy, infrastructure, agriculture and food, consumer 
protection, citizen’s rights, constitutional questions and functioning of the EU, territorial questions, administration 
and bureaucracy, elections. 
iii The Austrian parties published 1,807 press releases in the period of observation, which is more than twice as much 
as the German parties, which sent out 833 press releases.   
 
